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John Nash: A Personal Remembrance
Vernon L. Smith
Chapman University
I was privileged to meet John many years ago at one of the many game theory conferences held at the
State University of New York, Stony Brook. On this occasion, I was in the hotel breakfast room. I had
finished breakfast, and I recognized John Nash sitting at a table, also alone, in the corner. I was heading
to the day’s first conference presentation room where I would be making a presentation on our electric
power experiments, conducted in collaboration with my colleagues Stephen Rassenti and Bart Wilson,
who were not at the conference. (Rassenti et al., 2003a, 2003b)
I was not sure how to find the conference room where I would be presenting so I walked over to John
Nash’s table, introduced myself, and asked him if he knew where the room was. He replied that he was
not sure himself, and suggested we look for it together. We found the room. After I gave my
presentation, John asked the first question as a member of the audience; afterwards he came up to talk
with me, fascinated by the whole exercise of designing a market for the exchange of wholesale power
on a high voltage grid, and using laboratory subjects to test it in experiments. Moreover, as we report in
Rassent et al. (2002), the exercise had been an essential element in informing the liberalization of the
industry in New Zealand and Australia. John particularly wanted me to know that his father had been an
electrical engineer and that he had always been interested in the subject.
I want to point out that without either of us thinking about it as such, John’s proposal that we look for
the room together, and my acceptance of it, demonstrated that we had chosen actions that constituted
a Nash Equilibrium “solution” to our joint interactive task. At the time, we were neither friends nor both
strangers—he was hardly a stranger to me for he was long known and acclaimed as one of the foremost
contributors to mathematics and economics in the 20th century. I was surely a stranger to him as I was
little known generally before the Nobel Foundation managed to find me in 2002.
Some might say that my happy encounter with John was too “collaborative” to be a good example of a
non-cooperative equilibrium, frequently believed to apply only to inherently competitive adversaries.
But why is anyone collaborative with another, if not because they have mutual interests that draw them
together, with each worse off if acting alone?
Bidding at an auction for a work of art is only made possible by the many for whom the work has special
value, inducing them to attend the auction. Their bidding behavior can be represented under particular
conditions by a Nash Equilibrium bid function, b (v), where v is the value of the work to a bidder and b
her corresponding equilibrium bid. The form of this Nash Equilibrium bid function varies with the rules
of the auction. The particular conditions that allow these bid function strategies to be derived by Nash’s
methods, can be created in the laboratory, and a great many experimental studies of auction bidding
behavior have been motivated by John’s insightful contributions. (Cox et al., 1982) “Insightful” is the
right word, because Nash’s teacher, John von Neumann, saw the Nash theorem and its proof as trivial. I
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suppose you could say that Einstein’s contributions followed trivially once the equations of motion in
physics took account of the finite velocity of light. What was truly astonishing for both Nash and Einstein
was the insight they had in the context of the thought frameworks of their respective times.
Bidding to sell or to buy wholesale electrical energy on a complex high voltage grid can also be
characterized in terms of Nash theory. Moreover, in repeat interaction subjects who have no knowledge
of that theory do remarkably well in approximating Nash predicted behavior.
A relatively unknown fact about Nash was that he was much interested in whether and how people
might actually come to play the equilibrium of a game as he represented it. In his PhD dissertation
(Nash, 1950), there are two closing sections on “Motivation and Interpretation” and “Applications” that
incisively discuss the theory’s empirical relevance.
It is here that he observes that “the accepted ethics of fair play imply non-cooperative playing…” (p 26),
that is, independence of action and a certain innocence of manipulative intent—an uncommon
perspective in contemporary thinking. When he and I first met, neither of us had any expectation that
we would become allies in looking for the seminar room!
In his thesis, Nash considers “the ‘mass-action’ interpretation of equilibrium…It is unnecessary to
assume that the participants have full knowledge of the total structure of the game, or the ability and
inclination to go through any complex reasoning processes. But the participants are supposed to
accumulate empirical information on the relative advantages of the pure strategies at their disposal.”
(Nash, 1950, p 21)
In such situations, laboratory experiments draw their power from affording cash motivated human
subjects with empirical experience in interactions within the structure of the game we put them in. They
are assigned and incentivized by strictly private values for outcome allocations, receive feedback
information on the outcomes of their joint actions, and through repeat play gain empirical experience
on better and worse outcomes. In many examples, including some that are quite complex, they
converge to approximately equilibrium outcomes, perhaps in the sense that Nash referred to as a “mass
action” process. (Smith, 2008) Moreover, increased public information on individual values, is often
inimical to better individual and/or group outcomes. (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963, pp 57-58; 142-151;
184-193; 199.) Hence, more information does not imply better outcomes.
Much is still to be learned about exactly how people get it right in the successful examples, or how and
where they go wrong when they fail to converge to the equilibrium.
In our encounter John never mentioned his work and its obvious relevance to what we were learning
from the electric power experiments. Rather he mentioned his father. My impression was that John was
a wonderfully lovable man.
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